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The aim of this article is to contribute to the development of ecological-economic incentives
in conservation policy. Our approach uses strategies for establishing ‘habitat networks’ as an
example to develop spatially-oriented incentives in urban landscapes. The incentives should
ideally consider aspects both of ecological effectiveness and economic efficiency. Our
understanding of ecological-economic incentives reaches beyond this stage: not only must
economic incentives in environmental policy be based on ecological knowledge, but also, they
have to consider social aspects of implementation and acceptance.
The ecological analysis of strategies for species protection in urban landscapes leads to
management recommendations as a basis for the specification of environmental policy goals.
Based on ecological knowledge, which shows where to invest scarce resources, the economic
perspective aims at analysing and evaluating environmental policy instruments for their
suitability and efficiency. The ecological and economic research is to be combined with a
sociological approach, which investigates the choice and application of environmental policy
measures as a system of social action. The analysis of problems of implementation and
acceptance will be used to support the introduction of new instruments or to improve existing
incentive systems related to nature conservation in urban landscapes.
For this purpose, a survey was carried out on the use of environmental policy instruments
(regulation, planning, economic incentives, communication, information) in German cities in
1997. Furthermore, two existing economic instruments in German nature protection policy are
analysed in detail: the compensation charge as part of the impact regulation and incentive
programmes on the level of the German federal states that offer financial incentive measures
for nature protection.
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Conservation problems have ecological, economic and social aspects and all three aspects
must be included in problem solving. Mangel et al. (1996, p. 340) stress the ‘increased
recognition of the role of social and economic factors in determining whether a management
regime will be successfully implemented, regardless of how sound it is scientifically’. In this
context we present an interdisciplinary analysis aiming at incentives for nature conservation in
urban landscapes. The ecological, economic and social research will be combined to find
answers to the following questions: Which incentives or environmental policy instruments are
suitable to promote innovative nature conservation policy? More specifically, what kind of
incentives can be used for strategies aiming at habitat networks in urban landscapes? What are
the problems of implementation and what can be possible ways of their elimination?
Habitat destruction and landscape fragmentation belong to the most important reasons for
losses of biodiversity (Wilson 1988; Henle and Streit 1990). Hence, effective conservation
strategies are needed which allow these negative effects to be effectively counteracted. One
such concept is based on ‘habitat connectedness’ or ‘habitat networks’, the aim of which is the
support of recolonisations as compensation for local extinction (Settele et al. 1996; Kleyer et
al. 1996). An important question consists in determining the conditions under which habitat
networks really lead to noticeable effects on species survival (Henle and Rimpp 1993). On the
one hand there is much uncertainty concerning the ecological effectiveness of habitat
connecting strategies. On the other hand the individuals’ perception of their landscape
determines the ecological effect, which can really be attained through a change in a landscape
element. A mathematical model enabled us to analyse the ecological effectiveness of habitat
connecting strategies and to deduce management recommendations.
Ecological findings are closely connected to economic research. The ability to distinguish
between ‘taboo’ and ‘sacrifice’ corridors supports the finding of compromises between
conservation interests and competing land use options. This precondition for trade-offs is
especially important in densely populated areas. Knowing the ecological optimum increases
the chances of investing scarce financial resources for nature conservation with maximum
effects from an ecological and economic point of view. The economic perspective aims at
analysing and evaluating environmental policy instruments for their suitability and efficiency.
Conservation goals will be best achieved by an approach that uses the widest available range3
of appropriate measures and strategies. The dominant role of regulation and planning in
conservation policy calls for an enhancement of approaches that take advantage of market
forces (SRU 1996). Economic instruments in environmental policy make use of the price as
the central steering mechanism in market economies and represent continuous incentives for
innovations. Economic incentives will often be the least-cost means of achieving
environmental objectives (OECD 1994). They can be used to solve economic optimisation
problems in a static context, such as the internalisation of environmental externalities.
However, they can also be designed for evolutionary strategies, e.g., so that they help to
continuously adapt economic patterns of development to ecological patterns of development
(Ring 1997).
A special emphasis will be placed on implementation, because environmental policy
instruments or incentive systems can only take effect if they are adopted as actual, functioning
policy (Mangel et al. 1996). For this reason, the ecological and economic research is to be
combined with a sociological approach, which investigates the choice and application of
environmental policy measures as a system of social action. The potentials and limits of
implementing specific policy programmes are to be analysed. The exemplary investigation
and classification of implementation deficits and problems of acceptance will be used to
support the introduction of new instruments or to improve existing incentive systems related
to nature conservation in urban landscapes.
2  Evaluating the ecological effects of certain landscape
manipulations
Anthropogenic activities such as the development of urban regions have enormously
accelerated habitat destruction and landscape fragmentation so that many species have become
endangered. Conservation strategies are needed that allow these negative effects to be
effectively counteracted. One such strategy is establishing ‘habitat networks’ to allow a
species at least to persist in a metapopulation - a concept that was first introduced by Levins
(1969): subpopulations live in isolated remnant habitats (so-called patches) with some
probability for local extinction. By single dispersing individuals, however, an empty patch can
be recolonised. This means that recolonisation compensates for local extinction.4
Concerning the effectiveness, there are at least two serious problems with which
conservational landscape management is confronted. First, in most cases, only a limited
financial amount is available for conservation purposes. However, and especially in the
context of habitat networks, there is a multitude of landscape elements (the individual patches;
the individual corridors) towards which a change may be focused. Hence, guidelines are
needed which allow management priorities to be set and scarce resources to be invested with
maximum advantage for species survival. Second, especially in urban landscapes, there may
be a lot of other land use options with which the conservation option has to compete.
Sometimes different alternatives affect different landscape elements. Hence, in order to
minimise negative ecological effects, guidelines are needed which enable decision-makers to
determine which variant is better for the conservation goals of the urban region. Both
problems, however, can only be solved if criteria and procedures are developed which allow
each landscape element of interest to be evaluated in terms of its relative importance for
species survival.
In that context, mathematical models may be useful. Models allow the metapopulation
endangerment to be quantified theoretically and the key factors of influence to be revealed
(e.g., Goel and Richter-Dyn 1972; Nisbet and Gurney 1982; Burgman et al. 1993; Hanski
1994; Wissel et al. 1994). Different scenarios of landscape management can be simulated
(e.g., Verboom et al. 1993) and compared in terms of their effect on survival (e.g., Drechsler
and Wissel 1997). This provides the basis for the guidelines needed (Frank 1998).
2.1  Recommendations for supporting species survival
In order to estimate the effects of habitat networks, we use a model that was originally
developed for describing metapopulation dynamics (Frank and Wissel 1994; Frank 1998).
This model allows metapopulation survival to be related to all relevant factors: the patch-
specific subpopulation features, the spatial patch configuration, and the pattern of
connectedness (which patches are connected by a corridor?). The mean lifetime Tm is used as
a quantifier for survival. In order to demonstrate the range of questions the model applies to,
we discuss three examples, in which guidelines are deduced either for maximising the
advantage for nature protection (optimum habitat connecting management; optimal
enlargement of area size) or for minimising the disadvantages of impacts (which corridors5
ought to be preserved, which can be sacrificed?). Our results apply to species that need a
physical habitat-like corridor for reaching another patch in the landscape.
An ecologically optimal habitat connecting management
There is much uncertainty concerning the ecological effectiveness of habitat connecting
management. On the one hand, there is a need for determining the conditions under which the
establishment of corridors really leads to noticeable effects on species’ survival. On the other
hand, there is a widely used rule of thumb that recommends to connect ‘as much as possible’
(Wilson and Willis 1975). This rule makes the user believe that corridors are always
advantageous, regardless of where they exist. In order to get some more insight into this
problem, the following questions have to be answered: (1) Does the addition of corridors
automatically lead to positive effects on species survival? and, in case the answer is ‘no’, (2)
Which pattern of connectedness is optimal and upon which factors does it depend?
In order to approach the problem, we simulate the addition of corridors as a change in the
patterns of connectedness (see pictogrammes I-IV in Fig. 1) and analyse the effect on survival.
To get more insight into the role of the patches, two scenarios are compared that differ in the
assumptions about the numbers of emigrants the inhabited subpopulations are able to emit. As
one can see by comparing Figs. 1a and b, there is no general answer to the question whether
adding corridors is advantageous for survival or not. As long as all subpopulations emit the
same number of emigrants (Fig. 1a), the mean lifetime Tm increases when corridors are added.
The complete pattern of connectedness (IV) is found to be optimal for survival. A totally
different picture emerges when the peripheral subpopulations emit much fewer emigrants than
the central one (Fig. 1b). The mean lifetime Tm even decreases when corridors are added.
Hence, the basic pattern of connectedness (I) where each two patches are connected by exactly
one path is found to be best for survival. To summarise, there are situations where the addition
of corridors becomes detrimental for survival. Hence, the widely used rule of thumb ‘As much
as possible’ is not valid in general. This indicates that more sophisticated guidelines for
habitat connecting management are needed.
The following factors are found to be essential for the question which pattern of connected-
ness is actually optimal for survival (Frank 1998): the relative area size and habitat quality of
the individual patches and, the species’ characteristics concerning emigration and dispersal.6















































Fig. 1:  An ecologically optimal habitat connecting management
The mean lifetime Tm of a metapopulation for four patterns of connectedness (see pictogrammes I-IV) for two
different assumptions (a and b) concerning the numbers of emigrants the subpopulations are able to emit.
In contrast to this, all details of species’ reproduction have been found to be of no relevance
for the question of interest. These results unequivocally show that there cannot be any pattern
of connectedness that is optimal for all species. Common guidelines for habitat management
can only be deduced for classes of species with a common behaviour in emigration and
dispersal. However, note that species’ ecology and, hence, this classification may differ
between landscapes!
In case all patches are of the same habitat type, a rule of thumb is: A pattern of connectedness
is optimal for survival when both of the following conditions are met: (1) there are only
corridors towards patches in a reachable vicinity and, (2) all corridors are placed according to
the relative area size of the patches (the largest patches have the most corridors). Achieving
exactly the optimum is doubtless impossible, but knowing the optimum enables the planner to
determine where to invest scarce resources with maximum ecological effect.
Enlargement of the total area size: an alternative?
In a case as considered in Fig. 1b, financial resources ought not to be invested in the
establishment of further corridors because negative effects on survival would be induced. In
this case, a real advantage can only be attained if the patches themselves are either enlarged in7
size or improved in quality. However, whenever an amount of resources is invested for
enlarging the total area size (of all patches), then we are concerned with the question where to
place the investment to maximise the effects on survival. In order to get some insight into this
problem, we compare three scenarios of distributing the resources over the individual patches
where the increase in the total area size is in each case the same. Fig. 2a indicates that there
are considerable differences between the scenarios concerning their effects on survival. The
scenario ‘4:1’ (four shares for the ‘Large’ and one share for each ‘Small’ patch; see the dashed
line) is found to be the best, regardless of the total area to be distributed. Our model results
also reveal that the optimum strategy is never general, but strongly dependent on the pattern of
connectedness. Maximum effects on survival can be attained when all patches benefit
according to their numbers of corridors.
All into the "Small's"
All into the "Large"
 4:1 



















































Fig. 2:  Enlargement of the total area size: an alternative?
a) The mean lifetime Tm of a metapopulation with a pattern of connectedness as shown by the pictogramme
versus the increase in the total area size ∆ TA for different scenarios of distributing the area over the patches.
b) Mean lifetime Tm versus total area size TA under the precondition that the area is optimally distributed.
Fig. 2b shows the relationship between mean lifetime Tm and total area size TA that results
when the area is optimally distributed, i.e., according to the pattern of connectedness. In spite
of the differences between the patterns of connectedness under consideration, all curves are
close to each other, i.e., the survival chance is nearly the same. All negative effects of missing
corridors can be widely compensated by ensuring an adapted area distribution. In such a
situation, it does not make any sense to establish further corridors. If the total area size is
enlarged, much stronger effects on survival are attained. Fig. 2b also reveals that the total area8
size has to exceed a certain minimum, otherwise there is no chance of attaining really long
times to extinction at all.
These results have serious consequences for conservation management: as long as some basic
pattern of connectedness is ensured (for the definition see above), no financial amount ought
to be invested in establishing further corridors. These resources ought instead to be used for
enlarging the total area size, provided the ecologically important patches can be enlarged.
Which corridors should be preserved from elimination?
So far, we were concerned with questions of conservation planning and maximising survival.
In reality, we are more often confronted with the opposite situation: there are land use options
which, when realised, inevitably lead to the elimination of landscape elements. Hence,
guidelines are needed which allow the variant to be determined that is least disadvantageous
for species survival. In order to get some insight into the effect of corridor elimination, we
consider the following situation: there is a habitat network with a pattern of connectedness as
in Fig. 3a. There are two possible land use options each inducing the destruction of two



























Fig. 3:  Which corridors should be preserved from elimination?
a) Two possible land use options each inducing the destruction of two corridors.
b) The mean lifetime Tm of the metapopulation for both variants and two different assumptions concerning the
relative area size of the patches.9
Fig. 3b reveals that it makes a large difference for mean lifetime Tm which variant is realised.
This indicates that the individual corridors are not equally important for species survival. Fig.
3b also shows that there is no general answer concerning which corridors have higher
importance and, hence, ought to be preserved. As long as all patches have nearly the same
area size (the left pair), variant ‘A’ with its high balance in the numbers of corridors is found
to be less disadvantageous. In this case, the peripheral corridors are more important than the
central ones and, hence, ought to be preserved. A totally different picture emerges when the
central patch is much larger than the peripheral ones (the right pair). Now variant ‘B’ where
the largest patch has the most corridors is found to be better. The peripheral corridors have
lost their importance so that now the central corridors ought to be preserved.
To summarise, the relative importance of a particular corridor does not only depend on the
characteristics of the directly adjoining patches, but on the network as a whole: Which sizes
do the other patches have? How many corridors do additionally exist and where are they
located? The optimum pattern of connectedness gives the scale for ranking the variants.
2.2  Lessons from the ecological insights
Priorities for conservation management
How should habitat networks be managed with maximum effects on species survival? This is
the central ecological question underlying this article. In order to find an answer, several
factors to which management can be focused (such as the pattern of connectedness, the area
distribution, or the total area size) have been analysed in terms of their influence on survival.
Based on the model results given in Sec. 2.1, the following list of priorities for an
(ecologically optimal) management can be deduced:
1. The total area size of all habitat patches has to exceed a certain minimum, otherwise it does
not make any sense to establish corridors between the patches at all. Whenever the
financial amount is so small that this precondition cannot be met, all resources ought to be
concentrated and exclusively invested in the largest habitats.
2. Whenever the minimum total area size is exceeded, a certain financial amount ought to be
used for establishing a certain basic pattern of connectedness (for the definition see above)
that is optimal for survival when the largest patches have the most corridors.10
3. All remaining resources ought to be invested in enlarging the total area size, provided each
patch can be enlarged according to its number of corridors.
The most important ecological result, however, is that conservation management (such as the
establishment of further corridors or the enlargement of specified areas) does not
automatically lead to positive effects on species survival. A real advantage can only be
attained if management efforts are invested in the right place. Our model results also reveal
what has to be found out about both species and landscapes in order to allow the right place to
be determined and management priorities to be set. This increases the chance of investing
scarce resources with maximum effects on species survival.
Options for a sustainable land use
Both areas and corridors may markedly differ in their importance for survival. However, a
concrete landscape element can only be correctly evaluated if it is considered in the context of
the whole network. Our model results also provide the criteria and a procedure for ranking the
landscape elements according to their importance for species survival. The ability to
distinguish between ‘taboo’ and ‘sacrifice’ elements allows us to identify the land use option
that is least detrimental from the ecological point of view. This facilitates finding
compromises between the conservation and the competing land use interests.
3 Social and economic aspects of nature conservation:
Policy and instruments
The management recommendations for habitat networks represent a scientific basis for the
specification of conservation policy goals. Based on ecological knowledge, which shows
where to invest scarce resources (conditions of ecological effectiveness), social and economic
research identify appropriate policy instruments and analyse conditions of their economic
efficiency and implementation.
3.1 The role of implementation and acceptance
Measures of nature conservation and landscape protection can only show their effectiveness
when they are put into practice. The initiation, development, passing and application of nature11
conservation and landscape protection programmes follows a complex, often tedious process,
in which many individual and collective actors are involved. Social structures and political
conditions affect the concrete set up of the separate activities as does the power distribution
of the involved parties in the implementation process. Therefore, an analysis that only
considers the ecological effectiveness or the economic efficiency of nature protection
measures is too narrow. The ecological and economic approach should be amplified by a
sociological approach, which analyses the political willingness and implementation process in
a social perspective. Questions of implementation and social acceptance are of special
importance in this case.
The implementation of political programmes
The term implementation indicates the putting into place of a binding political programme
(Mayntz 1980). The implementation comes after the phase of politics formulation, that is the
development, drawing up and passing of political action programmes. The separate phases of
the so-called policy cycle can be analytically separated but in reality they are often mixed
together. Laws, statutory orders, and administration instructions are part of nature
conservation and landscape protection programmes. Political programmes are composed of
(more or less precise) information about initial situations, goals, institutions (which will be
commissioned with the implementation of the project) as well as information about the means
and instruments for the realisation of these goals.
The implementation phase begins as soon as the political programme is finalised. It has been
known that the effectiveness of environmental-political measures can be impaired by the
specific conditions and forms of the programme implementation. During the course of the
programme there can be wide ranging deviations from the envisaged programme goals, and
there can be execution problems and deficits. Discrepancies between the norm and the reality,
programme goals and those actually achieved give evidence that political programmes cannot
entirely determine the results. The implementation plays a decisive part in the successes and
failures of political programmes. The enacting of a political programme demands a
multiplicity of concrete, context-specific measures and single case decisions of which not all
are present in advance. Programme formulation and implementation are different parts of a
sequential decision cycle (Luhmann 1971). The programme development means a
programming decision; in this phase the laying down of the general programme direction and12
the framework conditions are set up. Programme implementation means, contrarily, a
programmed decision. In this phase the establishment and concrete application of the given
programme take place; here the scope of measures and single decisions in the public project
area will be made. Programme implementation demands a piecewise interpretation of the
rules and the need for additional translation, dissemination and specification.
Actors in the implementation process
An older model shows the programme formulation to be the work of the legislative body, and
the programme implementation the work of the administration. This is not incorrect, but is
not enough. Often a multiplicity of further actors (individual and collective) with different
values, interests and preferences are tied into the policy cycle. This is the case for the
programme formulation as well as for the carrying out of the programme. During the
implementation of the programme the public administration and target groups meet and work
together. It cannot be said that the administration has a one-sided control of the situation.
More often the public administration is interested in close co-operation with the receiver
(Benz 1994). Co-operative set-ups ensure acceptance, ensure the agreement of those affected
by the decisions of the administration. In this way extra administrative costs due to political
or internal conflicts can be minimised, as well as the time and cost of legal administrative
contention processes. The present German nature protection law includes many hearings and
participants´ proceedings; the programme implementation often takes on the form of a
bargaining or negotiating process in which the separate actors endeavour to make their
different interests heard. It is important that the deals in the implementation phase are
differentiated partly from those in the legal phase. In the course of moving from the
programme formulation to programme implementation, wide reaching changes of interests,
participation and divisions of power occur (Bohnert and Klitsch 1980). For this reason it is
not seldom that the losing groups during programme formulation succeed in improving their
position or in changing their initial defeat into a victory in the following implementation
phase. The change of interests and influence spheres in the course of the policy cycle explains
why political programmes are often modified and altered during their implementation.
3.2  Environmental policy instruments: Local experiences
So far, the thoughts on the implementation and acceptance of political-administrative
measures have been completely abstract from the differences between specific instruments. It13
might be supposed that connections or empirical regularities exist between the choice and the
implementation of political instruments on the one hand, and implementation deficits and
acceptance problems on the other hand. For our analysis it is necessary to know which
instruments are actually used in environmental and conservation policy on a local level.
Further, we look into the economic efficiency of environmental policy instruments in terms of
their administrative costs and demands. From the viewpoint of nature protection laws it is
relevant whether instrument-specific implementation deficits and conflicts exist. The careful
analysis of instrument-specific implementation and acceptance problems are an important
prerequisite, or first step, for the identification of possible departure points for a more
effective implementation.
Survey on the use of economic incentives in local environmental policy
In 1997, a survey was carried out on the use of environmental policy instruments in German
cities. The aim of the investigation was to get an inventory and analysis of economic
incentives in environmental policy, how they are actually used and evaluated on a local and
regional level. Furthermore, future operational fields for economic incentives should be
detected by the local experts, with emphasis on nature conservation issues. The survey was
based on a questionnaire that was sent to the head of the environmental offices in German
cities with more than 200.000 inhabitants. A total number of 39 cities fell into this category,
from which 17 cities decided to participate and returned their questionnaire (44%). The
participation of cities related to their number of inhabitants was as follows: In the category
200.000 to 500.000 inhabitants, eleven out of 27 cities returned the questionnaire (41%). The
next category, with inhabitants between 500.000 and one million, showed the highest relative
feed-back: six out of nine cities participated in the survey (67%). Unfortunately none of the
three cities over one million inhabitants sent back the questionnaire.
The role of different instruments in local environmental policy
The cities were asked what role different instruments play in their local environmental policy
(Fig. 4). Out of 15 cities replying to this question, seven cities decided that the instruments
regulation (command and control approaches), planning, but also information play a dominant
role in the environmental policy of the city. Almost all other cities put the three instruments at
least in the second strongest category, stating that they are one instrument among others. The14
instruments planning and information were assigned a minor role by only one city each.
Following the three most important instruments, but considerably weaker in relevance, are
communicative instruments (round tables, negotiation) and economic incentives. Most cities
either use them as one instrument among others or perceive them as playing a minor role in
their environmental policy. Only one city perceived economic incentives as being dominant in










dominant role one instrument
among others
minor role no role
No. of cities
command and control planning economic incentives
round table, negotiation information
Fig. 4:  Environmental policy instruments in German cities
(number of replying cities: 15)
The situation differs somewhat when looking at the role of environmental policy instruments
implemented for nature conservation and landscape care (Fig. 5). Among the 13 cities
replying to this question, the majority (seven to nine cities) indicated that all instruments are
used as one instrument among others. Five cities still assigned a dominant role to regulation
and planning. Information seems to be much less important for nature conservation than for
environmental policy in general. Among the instruments playing a minor role, economic











dominant role one instrument
among others
minor role no role
No. of cities
command and control planning economic incentives
round table, negotiation information
Fig. 5:  Environmental policy instruments for nature conservation
(number of replying cities: 13)
Administrative costs of economic incentives compared to those of regulation
Some questions were dedicated to administrative costs of economic incentives compared to
those of regulation in water supply, sewage disposal, soil protection and nature conservation.
Concerning the introduction and application costs of economic instruments, it can be clearly
said that most cities simply do not know them (Table 1). The way German cities administrate
their budgets does not allow them to specifically assign costs to single tasks like introducing
or applying environmental policy instruments. Nevertheless, some cities tried to roughly
estimate these costs. In most cases, introduction as well as application costs of economic
instruments are estimated to be equal or lower than those of regulation. There were but a few
cities that estimated these costs to be higher compared to the corresponding costs of regulative
instruments. Given these estimations, administrative costs should be no obstacle to implement
economic incentives in environmental policy where they are appropriate.
It can be noticed that there is even a stronger tendency for the application costs of economic
instruments to be equal or lower than those of regulation. In only four cases, cities estimated
them to be higher, compared to overall six cases with respect to introduction costs. Apparently
administrative costs decrease, once economic incentives are introduced whereas the
administrative costs of command and control instruments change less from introduction to
application.16
Table 1: Administrative costs of economic instruments compared to those of regulation
Introduction costs (number of replying cities: 11)
higher equal lower don’t know
Water supply 1 3 2 5
Sewage disposal 1 3 2 5
Soil protection 2 2 2 5
Nature conservation 2 4 2 3
Application costs (number of replying cities: 12)
higher equal lower don’t know
Water supply - 3 3 6
Sewage disposal 1 3 3 5
Soil protection 1 3 2 6
Nature conservation 2 4 2 4
Further demands of economic incentives compared to those of regulation
Asked for further demands of economic incentives compared to those of regulation, the most
distinctive answer related to a need for higher expertise in economics (Fig. 6). This could be a
rather high barrier for introducing new economic incentives or improving existing ones on the
local level, because most employees in municipalities tend to have a professional background
in administrative fields, law, or with respect to environmental affairs, the sciences. Apart from
economic knowledge, personnel requirements of economic instruments in environmental












higher equal lower don't know
No. of cities
expertise in economics manpower requirement uncertain effects
control costs problems of acceptance
Fig. 6: Further demands of economic instruments compared to those of regulation
(number of replying cities: 12)
The relationship between environmental aims and economic incentives as instruments to
achieve them was indicated to be weaker than for regulation. This answer could be clearly
expected, since the purpose of regulation lies in achieving specific environmental standards,
whereas the cause-effect relationship of most economic incentives is due to a trial and error
process. Thus, four cities were not able to give evidence of this relationship, six cities
estimated these uncertain effects to be equal or higher for economic instruments compared to
regulation. Both control costs and problems of acceptance are predominantly estimated to be
equal or lower compared to those of regulation. This finding is especially important for
designing and implementing new incentives. Most cities are convinced that economic
incentives cause fewer problems of acceptance than regulatory approaches. Asked for their
interest to implement economic incentives, many cities argued that citizens welcome these
instruments for they can better accommodate the polluter-pays-principle than regulation. Once
economic incentives are implemented, control costs are estimated in most cases to be lower
than those of regulation. Control costs are strongly linked to administrative costs of
application and the coherent answers to these two questions strengthen their evidence and
relevance.
4  Economic incentives in nature conservation policy18
Since the OECD (Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development) has adopted the
Polluter-Pays-Principle in 1972 as a background economic principle for environmental policy,
economic instruments became more and more popular to achieve environmental objectives.
Through the use of economic instruments such as charges, taxes or tradeable permits, the use
of the environment can be integrated into the economic sphere by way of creating price signals
(Turner and Opschoor 1994). A further strengthening of the role of economic incentives came
through the Fifth Environmental Action Plan of the European Community (Commission of the
EC 1992). Despite many efforts of environmental economists to promote economic incentives
in environmental policy, mainly by stressing their economic efficiency (cost-saving aspects)
compared to regulatory approaches, their actual implementation has been marginal.
Nevertheless, many policy recommendations stress the need for innovative nature
conservation policies in which economic incentives should be more and more integrated
(OECD 1994; Tobey 1996; SRU 1996).
Looking at the implementation level of a nation like Germany, environmental and
conservation policy predominantly use planning and regulatory instruments. Economic
instruments often play a minor role (as our survey has shown), but at least, they seem to have
more relevance in conservation policy than in environmental policy in general. Main
experiences exist with two of these economic instruments, i.e., the compensation charge
(‘Ausgleichsabgabe’) and incentive programmes for nature conservation (Hartje 1994).
4.1 The compensation charge
The compensation charge is part of the so-called impact regulation (‘Eingriffsregelung’),
which is anchored in the German Federal Nature Protection Law (BNatSchG). It has been
transferred with slight modification to the different nature protection laws of the states of the
German republic. The impact regulation firstly aims at avoidance of adverse effects on nature
and landscapes, secondly at compensation of unavoidable effects. In the latter case, the effects
should be reduced as much as possible as well as be compensated for in material or monetary
terms. The nature protection authorities then have to fix the compensation obligations.
Material measures such as greening or the creation of comparable biotopes enjoy priority, i.e.,
measures that have a spatial and functional relation to the planned or enforced impact. When
compensation measures of this type cannot be carried out, compensation payments must be19
made. Thus, the compensation charge is no independent environmental charge, rather it
represents a compensation measure within the framework of the impact regulation.
Involved parties:Interventionist, authorities, and participating actors
During the execution of the impact regulation at least the three following groups are included.
First is the client who intends to make an impact; second is the responsible authority, which
checks the documents, carries out the participatory procedure, evaluates the detailed
statements and, after weighing up all the information, makes a decision; third, there are the
expert authorities for nature conservation. In accordance with rule § 29 BNatSchG, non-
governmental organisations for nature conservation that are approved and registered by the
federal or state environmental ministries are often involved. From a sociological point of
view the impact regulation is a sign of increased flexibility of the nature conservation law.
The regulation does not only differentiate between permitted and non-permitted impacts but
also allows a decision making process, in which different interest groups can influence the
ways and degrees of impact compensation.
Efficiency problems and implementation deficits
The compensation charge is a postoperative compensation measure. When allowed impacts
occur the Federal Nature Protection Law and the corresponding regulations of the states’
nature protection laws give priority to the settlement of material compensation measures
before the payment of compensation (Marticke 1996, p. 387). Usually there is the obligation
to physically compensate in the spatial vicinity of the actual impact. This can be a reason for
inefficiency. As we have shown before, it is extremely important from an ecological point of
view where nature protection activities occur. If compensation measures do not consider
spatial ecological conditions, the financial investment is made in an inefficient way from an
economic point of view. It could have a much higher effect if invested in another place. A
similar obligation exists in the case of compensation payments. Often, the payments also have
to be reused for nature protection activities close to the place where the impact has occurred.
Therefore we recommend for purposes of ecological effectiveness and economic efficiency to
reconsider and loosen the obligation of spatial connectedness between impact and
compensation measures. Legal steps in this direction have now been taken: a law for the
alteration of the building regulation and environmental planning came into force by 1 January20
1998 (‘Gesetz zur Änderung des Baugesetzbuches und zur Neuregelung des Rechts der
Raumordnung (BauROG)’) which allows this spatial argument to be considered.
In practice the compensation charge only possesses a reduced meaning (Hartje 1994, p. 346).
The incentive and steering effect the charge could have from a macro-economic perspective is
limited because the compensation payment does not consider the clients’ benefits of the
impact (Burmeister 1988, p. 147). The replacement costs, the removal costs or the economic
value of the areas used serve as criteria for the payment standards. However, large differences
between the regulations of the different states exist. Nature conservation authorities also
complain that the companies often achieve improved conditions through the negotiation
process, which is in the area of responsibility of an authority without competence in
conservation issues. The companies only have to threaten to transfer their investments to
other places (Heidtmann 1993, p. 70). In these cases, the disadvantageous situation obviously
becomes clear that the nature conservation authorities are not the primary responsible
authorities to lead the procedure. They only take part in a so-called ‘piggy-back fashion’
(‘Hucke-Pack-Verfahren’; Burmeister 1988, p. 20). A further implementation problem is that,
until now, there has been no consequential control of the regulating authority over the
payment and following municipal use of the contribution. Thus, compensation payments are
sometimes not imposed at all, or they only apply to the areas outside settlements (Lahl et al.
1992). Sometimes the money obtained is not passed on to the public treasury or it is not used
for nature conservation purposes (Heidtmann 1993, p. 74).
4.2  Incentive programmes for nature and landscape protection
The compensation charge payments flow from potential or real users in the direction of the
state or municipal budgets. The opposite is true for landscape protection programmes. Here
the public purse offers financial incentive measures to support and stimulate landscape
protection and nature conservation activities. The different programmes usually comprise
detailed descriptions of the objectives of the programme and the purpose of allocation.
Furthermore, application procedures, potential target groups, grant prerequisites as well as
methods and extent of financing are elaborated. A complex relationship between the public
and private participants developed out of the formal and informal contacts formed during the
implementation of the incentive programmes.21
Financial support for specific nature protection activities
Incentive programmes comprise exchange and regulation components (Hucke 1983). On the
one side the exchange component consists in the voluntary decision of the potential
programme target groups whether they take the financial offer or not; on the other side,
undertaking specific nature protection activities, which lie in the public interest, are
prerequisites for the reception of financial contributions. The allocation of the financial help
is linked to encompassing preconditions and regulations that form the regulatory element.
Financial incentive measures are interesting from the point of view of the target groups
because they consist of money out of the public purse. The regulative conditions are accepted
when the financial benefits outweigh the costs of the conservation activities. From the target
groups’ side of the programme there is, therefore, a generally positive basic attitude to this
kind of financial instruments. The fundamental acceptance of the financial receiver explains
the favouring of grant programmes by the executing authorities −  the instruments are proved
to be less conflict laden than bans, fees, or charges. This point of view has often been
supported by the environmental authorities of the German cities (see Sec. 3.2). This does not
mean that no acceptance problems and conflicts occur during the implementation of the
incentive programmes; this is caused, among other things, through the refusals of grant
applications; sometimes extremely detailed subsequent demands are required by the
authorities.
In view of the future application of our results in the Leipzig area (Saxony, Germany), we
made an investigation specifically aimed at incentive measures for nature conservation at the
state level of Saxony. Several environmental and agricultural state programmes have been
identified that might be suitable for the integration of spatially-oriented measures. Incentive
measures for nature protection and landscape care (SMU 1997) and conservation contracting
(SMU 1995) fall in the area of responsibility of the environmental ministry in Saxony
whereas the cultural landscape programme is part of the incentive programme on
environmentally friendly agriculture (SML 1995) and has been issued from the agricultural
ministry. Especially the directive on incentive measures for nature protection and landscape
care might be suitable to integrate the management recommendations concerning habitat
networks. Among others, the allocation possibilities embrace measures for habitat
management and landscape care, measures for biotope design, habitat networks, and
measures for species protection. Therefore it seems to be a minor effort to further consider the22
management recommendations for habitat networks elaborated earlier in this article.
However, the directive primarily applies to measures that are undertaken either in or adjacent
to existing protected areas. It is the cultural landscape programme that applies to the rest of
the areas, which are predominantly parts of open landscapes. In the latter programme, mainly
extensification measures, but also a few biotope related measures can be financially
supported. Therefore, an adaptation of incentive programmes both in the areas of
environmental and agricultural affairs should be envisaged to include management
recommendations for habitat networks.
Implementation problems and deficits
The implementation of incentive programmes can be divided in different phases: the phases
of the concrete programme formulation and budgeting, the distribution of resources, the
granting of resources as well as the resource use. Implementation problems and deficits occur
in all phases. The programme set-up requires that many detailed decisions are made relating
to the preconditions of grants and the specific regulations to be fulfilled by the target groups.
These detailed decisions require an extensive knowledge, which, when not available, can
cause certain forms of over- and under-regulation. There are similar questions when it comes
to making decisions about the distribution of resources. Our ideas as presented in the first part
of this text, make it clear that it is not the equally distributed financial help, but rather the
locally specified grants that often prove to be better. The implementation problems in this
phase are therefore caused by the existing resources being falsely situated or dispensed
incorrectly.
The participation in incentive programmes is voluntary. Thus, the insufficient dissemination
of knowledge about the incentive programme causes restrictions in the phase of granting of
resources. Short term programmes have to deal with the problem of insufficient
announcement. Longer term programmes have to deal with the problem that stable
relationships between the authorities and already established clients can make it difficult for
new applicants to enter the programme. The lack of personnel in the authorities makes the
careful control of the resource use difficult. This is a reason why the success of incentive
programmes may not depend on ecological effects, but, although rather paradoxically, often
on the emptying of the grant bowl. In this way the contributions are paid, even when the
agreed conservation activities in return for the payments never occur, or are incomplete. Once23
incentive programmes are enacted, administrations are prone to stick to them even in cases
when much more effective possibilities for problem solving show up. Therefore it is
necessary to keep a permanent alertness and adapt or change incentive programmes whenever
innovative solutions can be integrated to make the programmes more ecologically effective or
economically efficient.
5 Conclusion
As we have demonstrated in the present article, there are options to invest scarce resources
with much higher effects for species survival than practised up to now. We have shown that
the ecological effectiveness of a given financial effort for conservation activities strongly
depends on the way these resources are allocated in spatial terms. Mathematical models can
help both to quantify ecological effects and to reveal important relationships between habitats.
This finally provides the basis for ecologically founded guidelines to effectively design
economic incentives for conservation policy.
A survey on the use of different environmental policy instruments (regulation, planning,
economic incentives, communication, information) in German cities has shown that regulation
and planning dominate less in conservation than in general environmental policy and that
there is a tendency that the different policy instruments analysed are on a more equal level in
nature protection. As a result of our analysis of two policy instruments in German
conservation policy, the compensation charge and incentive programmes, we recommend to
reconsider and loosen the obligation of spatial connectedness between impact and
compensation measures. Finally, we judge the incentive programmes to be suitable for
integration of the management recommendations that have been identified concerning habitat
networks.
To further promote the role of economic incentives or other instruments using market forces
in conservation policy, implementation issues should be carefully considered. The present
implementation practices cause specific barriers that decrease their effectiveness.
Administrative implementation deficits may substantially add to the restricted steering and
incentive effect that the compensation charge and incentive programmes exhibit so far. An
important future task is to elaborate concrete proposals for the elimination of implementation24
and acceptance problems that would fundamentally improve the ecological effectiveness and
economic efficiency of nature and landscape protection.
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